Nonviolent Peaceforce and its Sri Lanka Project
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) is an international unarmed peaceteam composed of trained civilians. In partnership with local groups, NP members apply non-violent strategies to protect human rights, deter violence and help local peacemakers in their work. Conceived at the 1999 Hague Appeal for peace and formalized in India in 2002, the NP includes over 90 Member Organizations from all over the world. Its goal is to create a large-scale Peaceforce ready to serve in conflict areas around the word, providing an alternative to military intervention.

NP launched its first project in Sri Lanka in 2003, responding to invitations from local groups. Today NP has 50 project staff in Sri Lanka (Including the main Sri Lanka office in Colombo) working at the grassroots level in three volatile districts of Jaffna, Batticaloa (offices in Batti town and Valaichchenai) and Trincomalee (offices in Trinco town and in Mutur) building upon two and one half years of work with local peacebuilders and human rights workers. Our peacekeepers are from 23 different countries and can collectively speak over 40 different languages. Our experience so far shows that nonviolent intervention at the grassroots level is an effective means to limit violence.

Executive Summary
The following report highlights the main challenges NP faced and summarizes the more significant cases to illustrate the variety of Nonviolent Peaceforce Sri Lanka (NPSL) activities between October 2005 and June 2006. It is by no means exhaustive of the activities and impact achieved in the different communities and at the national level in Sri Lanka .

Under the difficult circumstances described in this report, NPSL was forced to adapt crisis management methods in place of the preventative approaches. A key element of such a strategy is communication – information gathering and dissemination and rumor control and keeping channels open between communities and between groups and authorities. At the same time, NPSL is conducting regular risk assessments to ensure that it can still safely operate. NPSL's close relationships with all actors involved including strong ties in the communities is crucial in this process. NPSL can only function effectively if it is accepted by the communities and by the actors involved. Nevertheless, NPSL feels the need to beef up its overall security plans and sent several of its Field Team Members (FTMs) to a weeklong training of trainers program on safety and security. It also continues to review and update its emergency and contingency plans.

Many agencies working in Sri Lanka , including the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that depend on security forces for their safety, have come to realize that their protection can no longer be taken for granted. International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) meet also with bureaucratic obstacles: All international organizations are now required to get new work permits for all of their staff and orders by INGOs for safety equipment such as satellite phones are being held up by the Ministry of Defense.

Due to the fact that the situation is much more problematic and certainly less safe, only a few agencies are fully operational. These INGO workers are waiting for the situation to calm down so they can return to their posts throughout the country. Consequently, more and more people have been requesting assistance from NPSL, over stretching its capacity. Certainly, NPSL's emergency response capacity has been put to the test. The impact on its staff members cannot be underestimated.

In the face of the deteriorating situation, methods such as monitoring, information gathering, witnessing and coordination between agencies are crucial. NPSL is in regular contact with local civil society actors in Colombo as well as in the east and north and is developing new partnership agreements with international groups such as the UNHCR to coordinate protection initiatives and also to raise awareness about the violence in order to increase support for protection. As a frequent bridge builder, NPSL intends to focus more on tensions between ethnic groups including rumor control to prevent communal clashes (as happened earlier). Only the two key actors are capable of stopping the violence fully but there is as yet no commitment to do this and both parties continue to place civilians in harm's way.

The Political Context of NPSL's Work in Sri Lanka
Since the last quarter of 2005 the political situation in Sri Lanka has drastically changed. During the month of November a dramatic increase in violence in areas of the North and East followed a much-anticipated Presidential Election. There was a large boycott of the election in the Tamil areas, and intimidation and violence directed toward those who tried to vote. As a result , in many places in the North and East the turn out was very low or non-existent. In the other parts of the island the election proceeded with remarkably little violence; the election was claimed to have been one of the most peaceful presidential elections in Sri Lanka 's history. The elections were won by the then Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) running on the People's Alliance (PA) ticket with a narrow margin.

Shortly after the elections there was a sharp increase in violence in the North and East. Direct attacks on army and navy personnel, including claymore mine attacks increased, as did assassinations, including the killing of politicians and prominent community leaders. There was communal violence and clashes in bordering villages, violence and fear on the university campuses, and the Jaffna University was shut down. Security-related measures and accusations of harassment, particularly of Tamil citizens, increased all over the country, including in Colombo . Additional army check points intensified the scrutiny of people passing through the check points and late night searches of houses with questioning or detention for hundreds of civilians, primarily Tamils.

The announcement at the end of January that both sides would meet in Geneva brought relief and hope. A ceasefire has been in effect since 2002, but talks between the parties broke down nearly three years ago. The parties met on 25 th February for two days. The talks was claimed to be a success, exceeding expectations of the Norwegian facilitators, and a second set of talks was scheduled for April 19-21. This period saw a reduction in open violence between the parties, though some violent activities continued and assassinations still occurred in the volatile east. Cordon and search operations in residential areas also greatly dropped off.

Unfortunately, violence again rose near the end of March 2006. The April talks took place but ended without clear results, and an undeclared low-intensity conflict involving the three main armed actors—the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Karuna-group that split from the LTTE in March 2004 (and is allegedly supported by parts of the establishment of the Sri Lanka Army), and the Sri Lankan army itself—has been going on for several months now: A suicide bomb attack at the military headquarters in Colombo on 25 th April allegedly carried out by the LTTE led to two days of air raids on Tamil Tiger positions by the Navy and Air Force in the Northeast. In early May another incident involving an attack on the navy by LTTE “Sea Tigers” led to another day of military action (shelling by the Navy on LTTE strongholds), and the so-far most serious incident in June has been the attack by suspected LTTE forces on a passenger bus that killed more than 60 people, many of them children.

In June the Norwegian mediators tried to bring the government and LTTE together for talks about the ceasefire without success. That the EU in May outlawed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation has furthermore complicated the mediation effort and led to the LTTE's demand to exchange the Scandinavian personnel of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) with personnel from non-EU-States.

Apart from the confrontations described above, there has also been a rise in communal tensions between Tamils and Muslims in some regions. A cycle of revenge killings in Trincomalee targeted civilians and was participated in by civilians. The tragic and disturbing assassination of five Muslim civilians killed while praying in a Mosque in Ampara was a notable example.

Each of the five areas where NP works has experienced violence. A pivotal event took place in November 2005 when a Muslim politician was killed in Mutur. Within hours revenge killings of Tamil civilians took place including the mob killing of civilians in a passing trishaw. Soon tit-for-tat violence was occurring and civilians were trapped in ‘other' communities. This was followed by displacement of hundreds of families that lived in the border or adjacent communities.

The Karuna group is the most organized and open paramilitary outside of the conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE. They are primarily active in the eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara. They allegedly carry out assassinations, military attacks on the LTTE, and acts of violence against civilians including extortion, kidnapping and forced child recruitment. They operate in government controlled areas and civilians fear to report harassment or violence to the police, as the Karuna group is widely believed in the east to be associated with the security forces.

Election monitoring in partnership with PAFFREL
NPSL seconded two FTMs to assist PAFFREL in forming its International Observation Team for the Presidential Election in November 2005. The International Observation Team had two main parts, the Pre-Election Observers and Election Observers. The Pre-Election Team consisted of 8 individuals from NPSL, making contacts in the districts and monitoring the campaigning of the parties. The International Election Observation Team during the actual election period consisted of over one hundred individuals - 45 of them recruited through NP's international network (in addition, 15 FTMs were involved in election monitoring). The international team used the groundwork laid by the pre-elections team. They strove to support not only the local monitors they traveled with, but also the impressive chain of stationary PAFFREL poll monitors they visited in their areas. On election day the international observers traveled in vulnerable areas, witnessed the opening and closing of stations, recorded and reported on the intimidation of voters or violent incidents.

In the northeast of the island, where there was a boycott, those who came to vote were obstructed by armed men, members of the LTTE, supporters of the LTTE, or were discouraged by grenades and other violence including killings. This created an intimidating and potential dangerous climate for election monitors to travel, do observing and documenting, or proclaiming the reality of the election environment. For this reasons, the role of the international election observers within the whole monitoring framework is important as they enjoy greater security and their presence can support the local monitors.

The cooperation with PAFFREL continued in the local elections that took place in Batticaloa in May. In a collaborative effort with PAFFREL monitors, the presence of two NPSL teams helped inspire voter confidence, induced positive behavior change among polling officials, increased the visibility of NP's work that led to new relationships with polling officials and the populace in general and mitigated hostilities common to local elections in Sri Lanka .

District level activities – Jaffna

Supporting human rights groups in the wake of an increase in killings
Of all of the government controlled areas, the people of Jaffna have the strongest identity with the LTTE movement. When there are attacks or threats to security forces, civilians are suspected, searched, arrested and/or the victims of revenge. The relationship between the security forces and the civilians is therefore one of frequent mistrust and at times hostility. Grenades and claymore mine attacks that target security forces can result in retaliation or suspension of human rights protocols in search and arrest procedures. In addition, Jaffna has many high security zones and a heavy military presence. At times of trouble, there are few police or security personnel well trained to work in a civil environment.

In Jaffna and the Northern district, public executions of civilians rose dramatically in the last months of 2005. Some were killed for breaking tax or other policies of the LTTE, while other killings were done in public and/or politically motivated, including the killing of two school principals. Most of these shootings in the northern province were attributed to the LTTE, though not all. Though the NP Jaffna remained a small team in 2005, they did a lot of fact finding during this time regarding human rights and the violence in the district. There is much less political space to talk openly about human rights abuses by the LTTE, and a perception that addressing human rights abuses of the security forces brands one a ‘LTTE sympathizer.' NP particularly worked with the Human Right Commission at the end of 2005, either traveling together or complementing each others' efforts and strengths.

An example of such human rights related work has recently occurred in Jaffa: After the murder of a family (including a 4-year old and a baby) and several other people in a small community on one of the Kayts Islands in the Jaffna peninsula in May, the team provided protection to hundreds of people from the community who had fled in fear to the local church. For more than a week, the Jaffna team was visibly present, thus a deterring presence at the church, and accompanied others to safe places. At the moment, it is facilitating the safe return of the displaced to their homes.

Dealing with the consequences of military training of civilians
As elsewhere, Tamil civilians in Jaffna have been given military training by the LTTE, allegedly for self-protection. Groups to receive the training were identified strategically. This training further associates civilians with the LTTE and makes them a potential threat in the eyes of the security forces. Acts of violence against security forces are sometimes claimed by the People's Resurgence Force. Though frequently labelled an LTTE-front organization, its claim to be an integrated part of the civilian community only reinforces the blurring between civilians and armed threats to the security forces.

Raising the level of accountability of armed actors' actions
Some human rights activists requested NP to be present in or near residential neighbourhoods when they know of a search operation. Civilians say that they face violence and humiliation that can be deterred with international presences. Activists say they receive repeated reports that human rights norms and proper procedure are not being respected in the arrests and detentions. Even the police once appreciated the presence of NP as they said they wanted witnesses that they were treating the civilians with respect in their operation to stop misinformation. The Sri Lankans who tell us about these searches frequently say they cannot go to the area themselves, as they will be arrested. In response to recruitment of youth and children as LTTE cadres, NP's team took complaints to their contacts who are directly connected or indirectly related to the LTTE. They also accompanied parents to submit complaints to the LTTE directly.

Supporting local mechanisms to address inter-communal conflicts nonviolently
The conditions in Jaffna , including lack of access to the sea for fisherman, can put pressure on communities and stimulate conflict between communities and individuals. Displaced families have to compete for the limited access to the sea, and families in welfare centres for years are extremely poor. These conflicts can quickly escalate or become proxy conflicts if one or more party has real or perceived affiliations with one of the parties to the conflict.

In March 2006 the NP Jaffna team was trying to provide an active presence in a conflict between two IDP communities where one was accused of illegal sand collection (sand is needed to construct buildings with cement). The conflict turned violent, people were injured and civilians claim the other community tried to burn their houses. NP worked with the village level government official, heard the grievances and fears of the people in the villages, discussed the matter with police and tried to have an active, visible presence in both communities. Many IDP communities are vulnerable to these types of conflict, but there is an attempt to create local peace committees in the area by the Human Rights Commission, sponsored by UNHCR.

Responding to the fear of isolation in Jaffna during open conflict
The geographical reality of the area is that access to and from the Jaffna peninsula can be blocked at times of trouble. Therefore, some individuals and agencies fear being trapped in a conflict. Travel to the capital or to meet people out of the area involves passing multiple checkpoints and scrutiny by both sides, and is very difficult and frightening to people. NP has been asked to be ‘present' during the checking, crossing and travel of some actors with whom it has a relationship. It is also likely that many other international actors may leave the area if the access is closed. This has been identified as a time that our international presence would be very useful, but it would make our own internal evacuation and emergency plans for our personnel more complicated. The team has been consulting with other activists who have worked in Jaffna during open conflict to increase their capacity and to evaluate how to have the most effective impact while trying to maximize their own safety.

District level activities – Trincomalee

Defusing tensions among the three communities
Pongu Tamil Day (day of nationalist celebrations determined by LTTE) and pre-election rallies in October and November of 2005 raised anxiety and security levels in the town, but were generally peaceful in nature. The NP teams monitored and provided international presence during the lead up to Pongu Tamil Day, staying in contact with organizers, army officials and other agencies such as the SLMM. Again the tensions rose as the “Hero's Day” celebrations neared. This is a day when the LTTE leader celebrates his birthday and LTTE martyrs and makes a speech to map out the direction of the movement. This was more tense than the Pongu Tamil day. There was some searching of Tamil areas and a heavy presence of security forces, including at places of worship. The Trinco team again monitored the event, visited the areas where there were complaints and held meetings with various actors prior to the speech in fear that the hoisting of the flag, the reaction of the security forces, the speech or other events would instigate trouble. Some civilians complained and many found the situation uncomfortable, but no serious violence erupted.

Mitigating the consequences of the militarization of civilians
In the rural southern area of the district, near the Mutur office, heavy militarization of the Tamil community was going on. Initially young boys to older men who lived in the LTTE controlled areas were trained, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes by force or intimidation. By the beginning of 2006, the training was being conducted with Tamil civilians in the government controlled areas, including both adults and children. Meanwhile, the government security forces have been doing heavy recruiting for ‘Home Guards'. These are civilians who receive very basic arms training and are then given weapons to defend their communities. The Guards are generally regarded as less trained and less disciplined then the security forces. Again, this further blurs the distinctions between civilians and armed groups and increases the potential and capacity for civilians to use violence and be targeted for attack by one group or another.

Addressing the Tsunami-response and its potential to contribute to the conflict
When the situation allowed, the NP Trinco team learnt a lot about the grievances and accusations of those affected by the tsunami. They monitored a demonstration where 200 Tamil and Sinhala women sat blocking the roads in spite of a police attempt to remove them. The team supported their efforts to take up their grievances non-violently and to be taken seriously. NP continued to work with fishing societies with which we had also worked as they were struggling with renewed ethnic conflicts. The grievances around discrimination and corruption in distributing rehabilitation support of the fishing community continue to fester and cause agitatation. NP carried their grievances to government officials and agencies, accompanied them to meet with the lead agency on this issue, and attended a peoples' forum they organized to work pro-actively and non-violently on the issue.

De-escalation of communal violence in Mutur - December 2005
In early December a Muslim community leader and politician was shot down in the town producing an immediate rise in hostilities, calls for revenge, surfacing of hatred in some and fear in the majority of the population. A cycle of revenge started which included Muslim civilians attacking an auto (taxi) and killing its Tamil occupants. Muslims who had travelled from ‘their areas' to work in Tamil areas were trapped and victims of revenge. Within a single day, 8 people died in revenge killings and 7 people went missing. In government controlled areas, the patchwork nature of the Muslim and Tamil villages made travel difficult or impossible for many and there was a deadlock in communications between the communities. Families who lived on the border of their communities started to move away and approximately 1400 families were displaced. In addition, the area has many vulnerable families who immediately lost their income, including day-wage earners and farmers.

The NP Mutur team started monitoring and using their mobility and network of contacts to begin shuttle diplomacy right away. Initially they were relaying information and concerns about vulnerable people or civilians trapped outside of their communities. Later they facilitated the meeting of Tamil and Muslim leaders. At the request of Muslim families, NP provided presence and accompaniment to approximately 50 fisherman and woodcutters trapped in LTTE-controlled areas. NP also accompanied the spiritual leader of Mutur while he attempted to visit his people and calm the situation down. At scenes such as the hospital, where angry civilians received the bodies of the victims, the communities' leader was much needed to offer support and counter the calls for further revenge.

Once the situation allowed, there was a collaborative effort by NP, SLMM and the Foundation for Co-Existence to support the meeting of peace committee members, including the president who is the spiritual leader of Muslims in Mutur, to meet with the political leader of the LTTE in the area. NP transported the Peace Committee members to the meeting. In the meeting a Memorandum of Understanding was struck to work to end the violence. Both Muslim and Tamil community leaders agreed to use their communication channels to announce an end to the violence. The NP Trinco and NP Mutur teams worked together to convey the immediate needs of the effected civilians to other agencies and accompanied local and international agencies to the areas to give their relief and support. The NP Trinco team used the information they received from NP Mutur, at one point bringing the information by boat when the communications broke down. The NP Trinco team worked with the UN coordinating body OCHA, international agencies and local agencies to transform the information into a needs assessment, appeal for support and plan of action.

Protecting civilians during the escalation of violence in Trinco in January 2006
In the early days of 2006, five 20 year old men were killed and two injured on the beach in the heart of Trinco Town , very near the Gandhi statue. The authorities first maintained that they had been LTTE activists killed by one of their own grenades, but soon government security personnel came under suspicion for willful murder of the boys who, as their families were claiming, had no connection to the LTTE. There were expressions of very genuine grief and sadness; the funerals had testaments from religious leaders and community members about the boys. During the funeral, sentry points were burnt and the security forces were the target of much anger from the funeral participants and angry youth. There was violence and hand grenades were thrown at security forces.

During that time our NP Trinco team did a lot of monitoring and networking. We coordinated with several INGO and NGO staff to show active interest and occasional presence at the hospital where the surviving youths were. Similarly, the team worked with other agencies to provide presence at the funerals of the youth and were thanked by the families who felt it was helpful. NP tried to keep the communication lines between their networks of partners, other agencies and contacts open even when the streets of the town were empty. When the attacks on security forces escalated and allegations of aggressive or abusive behaviour towards civilians came, NP conveyed complaints to the security forces. NP Trinco checked false rumours of killings and dead bodies around town. NP's presence was requested in areas we had relationships with when the security forces were doing round ups or searches. The team worked with other international agencies to coordinate a conflict-sensitive approach to the situation and facilitated meetings where agencies agreed on protocols for hartals and to increase connections with Sinhala community members.

When SLMM briefly stopped work and other foreigners left the area, the local agencies and communities became very fearful of having lost any protective presence they may have provided. NP remained active. NP Trinco reached out to Sinhala youth groups, business men and others to learn their experience. They used these concerns to try to develop sensitive ways to monitor hartals. They also spoke with Tamil and Sinhala community leaders about the young men who were threatening the staff of the agencies.

Accompanying relief after the bombings
Both during and after the air raids on the Sampoor area by the Navy and Air Force in May, the Mutur team kept the outside world informed about the situation. As soon as the shelling stopped, the field and Colombo office together with other actors started to put pressure on the authorities to allow relief to enter the areas that were bombed. At the request of several humanitarian agencies, NPSL Mutur led an aid convoy into the area affected and assessed the situation. Further assessment showed that over 21,000 people had been displaced in the Mutur area. To complicate the situation further, civilians informed NPSL that the Karuna group arrived in the Mutur area days after the bombing.

Supporting peaceful coexistence
The violence in the district caused displacement in Sangama, a model village built by GoSL for all 3 communities to live in. They have lived peacefully for the last 16 years, including throughout the war. After a killing in the area and subsequent accusations of harassment by the Sri Lankan Army, 54 Tamil families displaced to a church and Sinhala families remaining felt exposed to retaliation from armed groups and angry at the effect of violence on their community. NP worked with humanitarian organizations to identify and support the displaced families. Our team brought the Sinhala leader of a nearby peace committee working in the area to visit the displaced Tamil families to see for himself the situation and to discuss their fears. They were fearful of the army. The peace committee and NP helped to arrange a meeting between the IDPs, the peace committee, the security forces, and Sinhala members of the community that were not displaced. An agreement was reached that the military would only conduct searches while accompanied by the police whom the people trust more. The Police agreed to set a police post near/in the community so the civilians could work with officers they were familiar with. They also agreed to have two women on duty at the post, which increased the capacity of civilians to reach out to police for issues concerning the protection of women and children. The IDPs felt confident and have returned to the village.

Community level mediation after the April market bombing in Trinco Town
The armed forces received strong criticism when a Sinhala mob began a rampage through the business area of Trincomalee minutes after the bomb explosion on a vegetable market on April 12th. Over 30 shops were burned, the majority belonging to Tamil people, as the armed forces and police stood by and watched it happen. The speed with which the violence erupted after the explosion seems to indicate an element of pre-planning and some observers referred to the situation as being reminiscent of “organized” riots in other parts of the country.

The Trincomalee team was quickly on the scene after the explosion and riots and spoke to various people who witnessed the scene. The riots lasted for several hours and spread later to border areas between Tamil and Sinhalese people. Many people fled to places of safety such as temples, schools and churches. On the way to provide protective accompaniment to some of these places, the Trinco Team was attacked by a mob of angry youth 10 meters from a military checkpoint. The team was able to get to safety—unfortunately the armed forces stood by and watched the windows of the truck being smashed to pieces and the team members being threatened with a hand grenade. In general, there are negative sentiments towards INGOs among the Sinhala community, who believe the international organizations favour the Tamil people. In the following days, the Trinco team provided accompaniment to local humanitarian groups delivering aid to those displaced, included Sinhala people and was also able to reach out to the gang that attacked them.

At the request of the civilians living in a certain area who felt that the armed forces increased tensions by putting up new sentry points and increasing their presence in a neighborhood already fearful of the army, the Trinco team engaged with the army commander and mediated an agreeable solution to all involved. Shortly after this positive result, the Trinco team found itself in a difficult situation at a church with people seeking safety from the violence. White vans, notorious for abducting people in Batticaloa, were trying to enter the church compound in Trinco. In a coordinated effort with the Colombo office, which made contact with the authorities, people inside the church soon received protection from the Police and Air Force soldiers.

Coping with increased hostilities towards INGOs - the attack on the NP Mutur Office
The resilience of the Nonviolent Peaceforce Sri Lanka (NPSL) was heavily tested this month when it came under attack by an unknown armed group. On May 21 at 3:15 pm , a shot was fired and a grenade hurled in front of the NPSL office in Mutur. The explosion that followed injured a field team member who was rushed to the hospital in Trinco town; a bullet had entered the truck that was parked outside the gate. The Field Team Member's (FTM) injury required surgery so with the assistance of the UN he was airlifted to Colombo where the fragment of the grenade was removed from his hip.

The attack, which was part of a coordinated act of violence against three INGO offices in Mutur, transmitted a major shock wave through the INGO community in Sri Lanka . A series of strong condemnations by international governments, the EU, the UN and others followed, in which a full police investigation and security were demanded from the government. No longer can INGOs and international staff take it for granted that they are safe. Although the incident came as a shock to NPSL, it was not a surprise. It has become more obvious that, despite the nonpartisan approach by NPSL, some consider its achievements a threat. Those groups who benefit from violence and fear see their efforts being undermined by NPSL.

District level activities – Batticaloa

Monitoring the conclusion of Temple Festival work
In October 2005, the annual temple season ended. NP teams continued to work with other INGOs, IOs and NGOs to provide an active and accessible presence at these events that have traditionally been high risk for violence or recruitment of children. NP took an active role in coordinating the efforts of agencies to provide presence at large temples or festivals in their project areas. International agencies also got to support the presence of their local partners and do outreach/information sharing about their own organizations and goals, stage entertainment and recruit young people for training courses. NP hopes this collective presence will deter violence, and involvement before, during and after the festivals enables us to better support local actors or families who have to deal with recruitment that does occur. During October, NP took a lead role in coordinating debriefing, documentation and suggestions/strategizing for next year's festival season.

Addressing the continued factional violence and lack of security for civilians
The violence in 2005 continued through to the end of the year and into this year. This included grenades, killings including public shootings in busy areas, and abductions. There was also public threats through notices, targeted threats with late night phone calls and extortion demands. By the end of 2005 the number of missing persons started to increase, but few were reported. Most of the violence is attributed to the factional fighting between the LTTE and the Karuna group, which is believed to be associated with the security forces in Batti district and widely believed to have their complicit if not active support. Most killings, including the public executions, go without arrest or even investigation. This environment of increased violence with complete impunity and minimal response or attention has a very frightening impact on the community. The capacity of the police to do anything about allegations of LTTE involvement is very limited, partly because of mistrust from the community and subsequent non-cooperation, and partly because of alienation of the police from a community they fear and associate with the party that is a regular danger to them. Civilians also fear reprisal from LTTE and/or fear that the police actually support the Karuna group, so complaining about their activities to police is felt to be dangerous and useless. Civilians are frequently left with a feeling of nowhere to turn, in part because of the impunity, but some do not receive support or care from their own community due to the high levels of fear (including visits from relations). There is also a fear to obtain death certificates or seek out documentation from local officials.

One of the extreme examples was the assassination that took place in Batticaloa's main church, in front of the well-respected Bishop who was presiding over Midnight Christmas mass. Gunmen seated behind MP Joseph Pararajasingham shot him and shot him repeatedly at close range, killing him and injuring his wife. The killers then escaped the church and the security. Pararajasingham was a member of the TNA party associated with the LTTE and also a member of NESOHR, the human rights arm of the LTTE peace secretariat. Mr. Pararajasingham's killing signified for people in the town the power and ability of the Karuna faction. Most killings and abductions are not so high profile, particularly when they take place in the poorer rural areas around the district. Targeted killings by both the LTTE and Karuna groups took place daily in the district last year. Sometimes families were entirely unaware of why their loved one was targeted.

In this environment our team in Valaichchenai has many visitors. They have a strong reputation within the community and people turn to them for help seeking help. Teams connect people to those who can help, provide knowledge about contacts and actions to take, accompany people to speak with those who may help if they are frightened and don't know where to turn, support them to file reports with protection agencies, or accompany them to a safer location. However, there are few options for individual civilians to increase their security. This is especially so for poor rural people who appeal to NP for help.

Supporting the alternative voices of peace activists
One strategy the team has is strong partnership with a collection of civil society peace activists who defy the acceptance of killings and constant fear. NP sometimes introduces affected families to activists in this loose network. Together NP and the peace activists visit families of those killed for whom someone in the network has a connection. They are unconcerned with the details of the crime or the perpetrators. They help them to attain documentation, to seek compensation, connect to local NGO programs, make official statements to authorities if they choose, or to obtain financial support. Peace activists also try to break their isolation and to support them by inviting them to small remembrance tree planting ceremonies with other families in their areas. NP also supported some of these peace activists who wanted to do a small anonymous road painting and pasting poems with a message simply of ‘Life'.

NP's role in the group was initially supporting confidence and a sense of safety when gatherings were in public, but we helped facilitate meetings and travel and provided other inputs, and hope that our active presence in the group and our clearly transparent non-violent, non-partisan approach and peace mandate contributes to the groups' safety and political space. NP has noticed a change in the confidence of the peace activists we work with. It took months of talking before they knew how to respond to their growing concern about the situation. It took weeks of preparation before they painted the word ‘life' on the road the first time, unsure how their message would be received. By the time they did a second road painting and tree planting ceremony in 2006 the group's confidence and comfort was dramatically increased.

Facilitating grassroots voices being heard in international forums
Another strategy the team has tried is to help others raise awareness of these crimes, largely ignored or unnoticed in the rest of the island, to bear witness and to support those willing to share or document their stories. In October the team worked with local peace activists to prepare information on the human rights situation for Mr. Ian Martin, special human rights advisor to the peace process. Women with missing sons and husbands who trusted NP and our partners had representatives actually meet with Mr. Martin personally. NP Valaichchenai also participated with the Human Security Work Group (see below) in a separate meeting with Mr. Martin to highlight the impact of the violence on the work of IOs and humanitarian agencies and to further share the impact on local people of the factional fighting and insecurities in Batti District. On December 2nd, NP prepared documentation and similar face-to-face meetings with affected families for Mr. Phillip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and Arbitrary Killings. NP also delivered an appeal by local activists to support them to stimulate change in the district, they appealed for more than just a report. NP was part of a delegation from Batticaloa who travelled to Colombo to meet with the general secretary of Amnesty International about the area. In all of the above, NP acted as a witness to the situation, retelling the stories that people have brought to our office and doing the necessary groundwork, trust building and organizing to introduce those families that were able to document the details. Our team acted as a catalyst to insure that these allies from outside of the district had access to the concerns of the citizenry of Batticaloa, including the victims, not just the officials. They could do this because of their trusted place embedded in the community, mixed with their privilege as an international peace NGO and their increased sense of safety while breaking the silence. NP was invited to work with the delegate within the Human Rights Commission on potential follow-up actions recommended by Ian Martin, and the subsequent reports and initiatives following these visitors reflect the efforts our team made. The impact of the visitors themselves is still to be determined.

Increasing human security within the Batticaloa District
NP has tried to play a similar role within the district. In particular, the Human Security Working Group is a small, informal sub-section of the international agencies in the district. They have collectively work to increase the safety of their staff and their beneficiaries and to increase stability. They have collectively met with representatives of the army and the LTTE to discuss the situation and to discuss the effect on humanitarian work in the area. The group collectively tries to come to understandings with the parties about things such as travel, accountability, safety, access and security. They also do advocacy for improving the situation. This has included letters to newspapers or officials to describe the situation or appeal for improvement in the situation.

In particular, NP has consciously included and is creating communication channels with different levels of and actors in the police, especially around the areas they live and work. They have subsequently used these communications channels at times of incidents, large search operations or arrests. A clear understanding of our work has helped when NP has shown an active interest and presence at the time of such events. One police officer even thanked NP as he felt our active presence had an effect on the behaviour of his fellow police officers who felt very aggressive towards the local Tamil population. The police in the area have suffered attacks and fatalities, including fatal attacks by previously friendly civilians known to them.

Protecting civilians in the border areas
The Valaichchenai team is continuing to work in the so called ‘border areas'. These are areas where neighbouring communities are controlled by different actors or communities. In Batticaloa district it is a particular problem where neighbouring areas are controlled by LTTE and army, or are strongholds of LTTE and Karuna supporters, or the dominance in the areas is being challenged by the Karuna faction. The insecurity in such areas is very high. The displacement in such areas is slow but significant. It could be from 30 – 50 families in a particular village. The individuals have few options for protection and the displaced families have nowhere to go because there are no safe points established. Our NP Valaichchenai team tries to use a combination of case work and active presence/witnessing/awareness raising to simultaneously have an effect on the area.

When NP visits and learns of activities they refer cases to other protection agencies and include the conversations with authorities and others. Residents continue to express their sense that NP's presence deters some of the activities rival parties engage in when they are openly contending for an area. One such area is 30km north of Valaichchenai, then 18km down a poor dirt road into the jungle. It is impossible to say for sure if and how such proactive presence in areas contributes to the release of abducted persons, but residents of such troubled areas have repeatedly told NP on each visit that their presence makes a difference to their own sense of security and ability to live in these difficult, vulnerable areas.

Coordination – Colombo Office
The past nine months have seen a lot of change, and a lot of growth, within NPSL. In October, a second group of FTMs joined NPSL, and now at the end of June 2006 a third group of 12 FTMs is currently undergoing in-country orientation before joining the field teams in early August. NPSL has increased the project management staff with the hire of a Communications Manager and a Human Resources Manager.

NP in Colombo is not only administrating and guiding the work of the teams but is also participating in coordination meetings, different forums and bilateral meetings with Colombo-based international organisations, local and international NGOs. This is an important part of our work in Sri Lanka to enhance our influence, as well as to support the fundraising that needs to be done in Colombo .

Glossary of Abbreviations and Names

FCE = Foundation for Co-Existence

FTM = Field Team Members

GoSL = Government of Sri Lanka

LTTE = Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (led militarily by Velupillai Prabakaran)

MPC = Mutur Peace Committee

NESOHR = North East Secretariat of Human Rights

NGO = Nongovernmental Organisation

PAFFREL = Peoples' Action for Free and Fair Elections

SLFP = Sri Lanka Freedom Party (governing party. Prime Minister is Mahinda Rajapaksa)

SLMM = Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. (Set up under the cease-fire agreement to monitor breaches of the agreement. Staffed mainly by Scandinavian military personnel in civilian clothes. Ca 50 personnel)

TNA = Tamil National Alliance (LTTE presenting party in parliament)

UNHCR = United Nations High Commission for Refugees

UNP = United National Party (concluded cease fire agreement with LTTE in 2001/2002, had majority until elections in 2004)

Photos: Bob Fitch , www.bobfitchphoto.com

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